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Technological innovation in the Korean mobile telecommunications 
industry has been dramatic and has turned it into one of the major industries 
in Korea today. The first mobile telecommunication service in Korea was 
launched in 1984 based on analogue technology. Analogue technology is 
generally referred to as first-generation technology and the Korean industry 
depended heavily on foreign companies and their technology at that time. In 
the 1990s, however, Korea succeeded in commercializing a second-
generation technology, CDMA technology. In 2002, the Korean mobile 
telecommunication industry is now moving into the third-generation phase of 
broadband mobile telecommunication and Korean firms are considered 
global leaders in technology for the mobile telecommunication industry. 
There are two groups currently competing in the world digital mobile 
telecommunication industry: the CDMA group and the GSM group. The 
industry is also composed of several sub-sections: telecommunication 
service providers, so-called carriers, switching system manufacturers, base 
station manufacturers, and handset makers. In March 2002, there were 
around 30 million mobile telephone service subscribers and the penetration 
ratio of mobile telephony is about 64% in Korea. The performance of 
handset makers in Korea is also remarkable. In 2000, handsets 
manufactured in Korea generated revenues of USD 11.2 billion and enjoyed 
an estimated 22% share of the world handset market. In terms of the CDMA 
market, in which Korean companies have a particularly strong position, their 
market share was 53.7%. Even in the GSM market, where Korean 
companies are considered to be relatively less competitive, their market 
share was over 10% (SERI, 2001). In addition, Samsung Electronics, the 
Korean industry leader, is now the third-largest producer of handsets in the 
world, after Nokia and Motorola. 
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This paper aims to discuss the pattern emerging from the evolution of the 
national innovation system in a technology-following country by reviewing 
how the Korean mobile telecommunication industry has acquired its 
technological competence. This paper examines the implications of this 
evolutionary pattern for Korean policy makers in their role as architects of 
the national innovation system. A national innovation system can be 
considered to be the mechanism whereby innovation is accomplished in a 
nation. From this perspective, the unit of analysis is the national economy 
and the major players involved in innovation are the government, 
universities, government-sponsored laboratories and private companies. In 
this paper, we focus on the inter-collaboration system among these players 
and discuss how the system has evolved with the progress of technology in 
the Korean mobile telecommunications industry. 
The following section will at first deal with the concept of a national 
innovation system. We will also review previous research and suggest an 
analytical framework for this paper. Some background knowledge of the 
mobile telecommunication industry will be also reviewed. Section three 
describes the industry's development in the first-generation and analyses the 
national innovation system in that generation. Section four describes the 
development process of CDMA, a second-generation technology, and 
considers the national innovation system in that generation. In the final 
section, we discuss the evolution of the national innovation system along 
with technological progress in the Korean mobile telecommunication industry 
and consider some of the implications of this evolution. 
! Analytical Framework 
The Concept of a national innovation system 
The concept of a national innovation system has recently become more 
prominent in the field of technology management. NELSON & ROSENBERG 
(1993) define the concept of a national innovation system by explaining each 
word. Firstly, they consider "innovation" as the processes by which 
companies master and assimilate product designs and manufacturing 
processes that are new to them. Secondly, "system" is considered to be a 
set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance 
of national firms or a set of institutional actors that play a major role in 
influencing innovative performance. Finally, as for the term "national", the 
authors acknowledge the difficulty of defining this concept. Although they 
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admit that many institutions are transnational, Nelson and Rosenberg still 
insist on the use of the word "national", as the role of a national government 
cannot be ignored in any innovation process. 
In line with the definition suggested above, we think a national innovation 
system is a set of institutions related to innovation in a nation. Here, we can 
think of several institutions relevant to a national innovation system. Firstly, 
industrial firms and their research laboratories are the major players in the 
system. Invention does not always result in innovation. Innovation requires 
trial and error, practical application and cumulative improvement. Profit-
pursuing firms, including their laboratories, which also reap the rewards of 
innovation, can implement these activities most effectively. Other institutions, 
such as universities, government-sponsored laboratories, and a national 
government itself, are also important constituents of a national innovation 
system. Universities not only educate future scientists and engineers, but 
are also fountains of scientific knowledge and hotbeds of innovation. These 
days, moreover, many universities try to provide private companies with 
technological services directly by setting up technology licensing offices 
(TLOs) and other industry related organizations. Government laboratories 
also play important roles in the national innovation system. Some are 
dedicated to basic research, while others do more applied research in 
public-related fields such as the military and health industries. Finally, 
government is also an important part of the system. Although it does not 
carry out research independently, a government not only significantly 
influences the direction of technological development, but also helps 
important industries with the means of subsidies. 
As we have discussed, a national innovation system is concerned with 
the roles and interaction of these institutions in the innovation process. The 
patterns of national innovation systems can differ from industry to industry. 
Private companies may do most of the innovation in a mature industry such 
as the automobile industry, whereas the roles of universities are important in 
other fields such as the biotechnology industry (CLARK & FUJIMOTO, 1991; 
POWELL et al., 1996). 
The patterns followed by innovation systems also vary from country to 
country. The reason why a national innovation system is important is 
probably because systems vary on a national level and different systems 
may result in varying performances in terms of innovation. When the concept 
began to be popular in the early 1990s, Japan was considered to be one of 
the most successful countries in terms of innovation and this success was 
thought to be closely linked to the country's innovation system. Japanese 
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success may have been behind some of the comparative research into 
different innovation systems among countries and their impact on economic 
growth. 
NELSON (1993) tried to find similarities and differences in the innovation 
systems of fifteen countries. Research by PORTER (1990) also examines 
differences among countries, although the author does not use the term 
"national innovation system" in his research. Porter focuses on the question 
of why some countries are especially competitive in particular industries and 
bases his answer on four factors, which form the so-called diamond 
framework. To summarize, these authors are mainly interested in a static 
comparison of countries, although they acknowledge the possibility of 
change in national innovation systems. 
Analytical framework 
As opposed to the research mentioned above, this paper focuses on the 
evolution pattern of an innovation system inside one specific country, rather 
than a comparison of different countries. The paper looks at Korea, which 
has seen tremendous economic growth during the last forty years. Although 
it may still be considered to be a developing country, Korea has recently 
shown strong international competitiveness in some industries such as the 
semiconductors, steel and mobile communications. In view of this fact, we 
consider Korea to be a technology-following country, rather than a 
developing country. 
Several researchers have looked at the technological development 
pattern or the innovation system of Korea. Early in his research, KIM (1980) 
suggested a stage-model of technological innovation in Korea that was 
regarded as a developing country at that time. According to this model, KIM 
argues that technological innovation experiences fluid, transitional and 
specific stages, an idea put forward by ABERNATHY & UTTERBACK (1978), 
and that firms in a developing country import those technologies in the 
specific phase from advanced countries and improve them. LEE et al. (1988) 
also suggested a more complicated model of technology development in a 
developing country. Arguing that patterns of technological development in 
developing and advanced countries differ, Lee presents three stages of 
technology development in a developing country: initiation, internalisation 
and generation. In his later research KIM (1997) introduces four analytical 
frameworks to analyze the incremental and discontinuous learning process 
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of companies in Korea, which is designated as a catching-up or newly 
industrializing country. 
While his previous research centres on the innovation process of private 
firms, the focus of this paper is the evolution pattern of the national 
innovation system of Korea, which is defined as technology-following 
country. It is worth noting that KIM (1993) deals with the national innovation 
system of Korea in his other research, but he takes a macro-economic 
approach in his review of the economic development of Korea. 
Acknowledging the accumulation of research in the field of technological 
innovation in Korea, we present a framework that analyses the evolutionary 
process of the innovation system in a particular industry, the mobile 
telecommunication industry. 
The analytical framework of this paper is quite simple, as shown in 
figure 1. We focus on the division of roles and interaction among institutions 
with regard to innovation projects. We consider innovation to be 
accomplished through role-division and interaction among institutions and 
we are interested in how the feature of role-division and interaction evolves 
as an industry moves through each generation of technological innovation. 
Figure 1: Analytical framework 
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In this paper, we examine two points in detail. Firstly, the evolving role 
played by the Korean government. One of the marked differences between 
national innovation systems in advanced and developing countries is the 
level of government involvement in the process of innovation. Generally, 
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government is more involved in this process in developing countries than in 
advanced countries. This paper charts the changing role played by the 
Korean government throughout the technological generations. The second 
point is the technological autonomy of domestic companies with regard to 
foreign firms. We will see how Korean firms have absorbed knowledge from 
their foreign partners and accumulated their own technological 
competences. 
Characteristics of the mobile telecommunication industry 
Before looking at the innovation process in the Korean mobile 
telecommunications industry, we briefly review some of the industry's 
characteristics. The mobile telecommunication system is also called the 
cellular system as it uses the concept of a cell. The system is typically 
composed of several instruments including handsets, base stations and 
switching stations as shown in figure 2. In line with the technological 
composition of the system, the industry is composed of several players: 
communication service providers, so-called carriers, handset makers, 
manufacturers of base stations and manufacturers of switching stations. 
Both base stations and switching stations are considered as equipment in 
this paper. In general, carriers purchase equipment from equipment 
manufacturers and consumers buy handsets from handset manufacturers. 
Figure 2: The components of a mobile communication system 
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Industry technology is generally classified into three generations as 
shown in figure 3, according to its level. Several technological options exist 
in each generation and differences among options are mainly related to how 
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to send the signal between a handset and a base station. A first-generation 
system is often called an analogue system, as the connection between 
handset and a base station is achieved using an analogue signal. AMPS 
(Advanced Mobile Phone Service), TACS (Total Access Communication 
System) and NMT (Nordic Mobile Telephone) are types of first-generation 
technology. The USA launched commercial mobile telephone services with 
the AMPS system in 1983 and this system was subsequently introduced into 
the Korean market. 
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Source: Based on information from IDC (2001, recited in LEE, 2001) and other sources. 
With the advent of second-generation technology, digital signals were 
exchanged between a base system and a handset and systems belonging to 
this generation are consequently called digital mobile communication 
systems. There are two types of competing basic access technology in this 
generation: namely TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) and CDMA (Code 
Division Multiple Access). GSM (Global System for Mobile 
Communications), used mainly in Europe, is the most widely adopted 
standard, while PDC (Personal Digital Cellular) is a standard, which is used 
only inside Japan. Both GSM and PDC are variations of TDMA. As the 
market for mobile Internet services grows, demand for higher capacities of 
data transfer in mobile communications will increase. The third-generation of 
mobile technology is ready to cater for this demand and two alternative 
technologies, WCDMA and CDMA 2000, are competing for market share. 
There are still many technological and economic barriers in the transition to 
third-generation technologies and the popularity of intermediate 2.5-
generation technology, an extension of second-generation technology, is 
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currently growing. At present, both second and 2.5 generation services are 
on offer, while third-generation service is in its pilot phase in Korea. 
This paper focuses on second-generation technology, which was the 
achievement of the Korean national innovation system. Korea was the first 
country to commercialise CDMA technology, although it borrowed the basic 
technology from Qualcomm, a US company. There are also two types of 
second-generation technology. The first technology is the CDMA IS-95 
standard, which uses the 800 MHz frequency band and we will refer to this 
system technology as the digital cellular system in this paper. The other 
standard is CDMA Upband IS-95 which uses the frequency level of 1.9 GHz. 
The service based on this technology is called Personal Communication 
Service (PCS) in Korea. In this paper, we will deal with the innovation 
processes in both cases. 
! First-Generation Korean Mobile 
Telecommunication Technology 
Birth and growth of the Korean mobile telecommunication industry 
Mobile telecommunications services were first launched in Korea in 1984. 
In response to market demand for the service, the Korean government set 
up the Korea Mobile Telecommunications Service Co. (KMTS) as a 
subsidiary of Korea Electricity and Telecommunication Corporation (KET, 
now Korea Telecom or KT) in March 1984. The company launched mobile 
telecommunication services, mainly the car-phone service, in the Seoul area 
at first. The company was designated a public telecommunication service 
provider and was renamed Korea Mobile Telecommunication Corp. (KMT) in 
1988. The company subsequently expanded the service rigorously and was 
able to provide coverage of the whole country by around 1991. 
In this first-generation of mobile technology, the Korean mobile 
telecommunication industry heavily depended on foreign companies and 
their technologies. At first, the technological standard adopted was AMPS, 
which was the US mobile telecommunication standard. As a result of the 
adoption of this standard, KMTS, which lacked technological competence, 
had to import most of its equipment from Motorola and AT&T. When the 
company introduced the service in 1984, it established the network system 
called EMX (Electronic Mobile Exchange) with Motorola equipment. To 
reduce the monopoly power of Motorola, the Korean government decided to 
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look for other equipment suppliers and requested a competitive bid for the 
supply of equipment in 1989. AT&T, Motorola and Ericsson participated in 
the bid. AT&T won the contract and supplied the APX (Autoplex) equipment. 
Table 1 shows suppliers of the installed equipment in 1991. A glance at the 
table reveals how heavily the Korean industry depended on foreign 
companies. The total expenditure incurred for setting up the mobile 
communication network from 1984 to 1991 was also about Won 180 billion 
and most of this amount was paid to US companies (SONG, 1997: 67). 
Table 1: Mobile telecommunication equipment installed in Korea in September 1991 
 AT&T Motorola Domestic Firms 
Switching Stations APX, 7 sets EMX, 4 sets none 
Base Stations APX, 173 sets EMX, 35 sets none 
Transmitters 3,729 RF 1,052 RF none 
Original Source: LEE et al. (1991: 33). Recited from SONG (1999: 67) 
Thirdly, the handset industry was also heavily dependent on foreign 
companies. When the mobile telecommunication service was introduced in 
1984, Korean firms imported handsets from foreign partners in Japan, the 
US and Canada and supplied them to the Korean market. Kumsung 
Electricity, for example, imported handsets from NEC in Japan, while 
Daeyoung Electronics imported them from Motorola, Dongyang Precision 
Inc. from E.F. Johnson in the USA, Hyundai Electronics from Novatel in 
Canada and Samsung Semiconductor from Toshiba in Japan. 
As of 1991, handsets made by Korean firms began to appear in the 
market, but their performance was poor. This situation is clearly reflected in 
table 2. Although Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics, and Kumsung 
Information and Communications provided handsets, Motorola dominated 
with a market share of around 50%. In addition, a lot of the components 
used in the manufacturing of handsets made by Korean firms were imported, 
as their own technological competence was insufficient to produce 
components at the time. However, it is worth noting that Motorola's position 
began to weaken as of 1995, when CDMA-based handsets were launched in 
the market. 
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Table 2: Market share of handset makers in the Korean market (in %) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Motorola 42.0 45.4 57.4 51.9 51.9 
Samsung Electronics 20.0 19.4 14.0 19.7 30.0 
Kumsung Information & Telecomm. 9.2 8.6 5.0 4.0 3.8 
Hyundai Electronics 9.4 7.8 na 1.3 0.3 
Others 19.4 18.8 23.6 23.1 14.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Original Source: ETRI (1997: 140). Recited from SONG (1999: 68) 
The national innovation system in first-generation technology 
Figure 4 summarizes the national innovation system in the first 
generation. As shown in the diagram, universities and government-
sponsored laboratories played a very minor role in the development of this 
generation. Universities may have supplied the engineers for carriers and 
handsets makers, but they were not directly involved in technological 
development. At this stage, the Korean government and foreign companies 
were the major players and Korean domestic firms were beginning to build 
up their own technological competences. Considering that most of the 
technology and equipment were imported from foreign countries, it could be 
argued that there was no national innovation system in this generation. 
However, we claim that the national innovation system in this generation 
was an important base for that of the second-generation. Without the 
experience gathered in this generation, the carriers and handset makers 
may not have been in a position to accumulate competence in the second-
generation so rapidly. The role of each player is briefly reviewed below. 
The Korean Government 
The Korean government played an important role in this generation. 
Above all, it set up the carrier KMTS, which was initially a subsidiary of KET, 
a government-run company. KMTS or its successor, KMT, preceded SK 
Telecom, now a private company and the largest carrier in Korea. 
Thereafter, KET also founded KT Freetel, the forerunner of KTF, the second 
largest mobile phone carrier in Korea at present. The government and its 
operating company consequently played key roles in creating and nurturing 
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the industry's major players. The government also selected the industry 
standard and restricted the monopoly power of foreign companies. 















Foreign and domestic private companies 
Together with the government and the carrier set up by the government, 
foreign companies were also major players in this generation. AT&T and 
Motorola engaged in most industry activities. They made their country's 
standard into the Korean standard and supplied most of Korea's network 
equipment. Motorola was also the leading supplier of handsets in the Korean 
market. The dominance of these companies and their reluctance to switch 
technologies eventually encouraged Korean companies and the government 
to develop their own original technology, resulting in the successful 
development of CDMA technology in the second-generation. 
Lastly, Korean private firms, mainly the handset makers, played only 
limited roles in this stage. They initially imported handsets from foreign firms 
and distributed them in the domestic market. Later on, they began to 
manufacture their own products, but their market share and localization level 
were not high. Today, however, some of these companies are world leaders 
in the mobile telecommunication equipment and handset market. The 
business activities of Samsung Electronics, now the third largest handset 
maker in the world, in particular merit detailed research. The company 
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already showed its future potential during this stage as the second biggest 
player in the market after Motorola. 
! The Second-Generation of Korean Mobile 
Telecommunications Technology 
Development of CDMA for the digital cellular system 
Dissatisfied with the heavy dependence of the domestic mobile 
telecommunications industry on foreign firms, the Ministry of Communication 
(changed to Ministry of Information and Communication in 1994) launched a 
project in 1989 to develop an original mobile telecommunication system. The 
objectives of this project were to develop digital network systems and 
handsets to replace imported products and to satisfy growing market 
demand. The project lasted eight years and ended in 1996. The world's first 
digital mobile telecommunication service based on CDMA technology was 
launched in January 1996.  
The total amount invested in the project over this eight year period was 
Won 99.6 billion and the manpower involved was 1,042 man-years. The 
government funded Won 53.4 billion of this investment, while KT and KMT 
funded Won 21.8 billion and equipment and handset manufacturers invested 
the remaining Won 23.5 billion. The major player involved in the project was 
the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), a 
government-sponsored research institute established by the government in 
1985. This institute was in charge of managing the whole project. Several 
private domestic firms, such as Samsung Electronics, LG Information and 
Communications, Hyundai Electronics and Maxon Electronics, participated 
in the project alongside the ETRI. Qualcomm also joined the project and 
contributed the fundamental technology of CDMA. 
This project was one of the most successful projects to have ever been 
managed by the Korean government, but there was a certain degree of trial 
and error in the development process. Before the launch of the project, ETRI 
was already engaged in a four-year research project, called "The project to 
develop a Digital Wireless Telecommunication System", which was 
scheduled to run from 1988 to 1992. The objective of this project was not to 
develop a whole system, but to develop only base systems and handsets. In 
January 1990, however, the Ministry of Communication reorganized this 
project, which was renamed "The project to develop a Digital Mobile 
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Telecommunication System". The purpose of this newly organized project 
was to develop a total system including switching stations and the research 
period was extended to seven years from 1990 to 1996 (SONG, 1999: 81-82). 
At that time, the project team was considering whether to develop a new 
system based on IS-54 TDMA, a US standard, but found it difficult to 
develop the system without support from advanced firms. Then the team 
approached AT&T, Motorola, and Northern Telecom, which were developing 
IS-54 TDMA, and subsequently focused on negotiations with Motorola. 
However, Motorola, which was the major player in the Korean analogue 
mobile telecommunications market, refused to accept ETRI's proposal. 
However, a researcher at ETRI happened to know of Qualcomm, which was 
a start-up company established in 1985. Although Qualcomm had the basic 
CDMA technology, it did not have competence in switching systems and 
mass manufacturing. ETRI's technology for switching systems coupled with 
its previously successful development of TDX and Korea's strength in mass 
production (SONG, 1999: 82-83).consequently made ETRI a perfect partner 
for Qualcomm. 
As a result, ETRI and Qualcomm signed a joint development agreement 
on May 6th, 1991. The agreement set out the responsibilities of each partner. 
Qualcomm was to be responsible for the design of the whole CDMA system, 
the development of base systems and the basic design of handsets. ETRI's 
role was to develop switching stations and base stations, as well as to work 
on the applied development of handsets and the design of the technological 
standard in Korea. Qualcomm and ETRI also agreed to allow Korean firms 
to participate in the project (SONG, 1999: 84). Following this agreement, 
another agreement was signed by Qualcomm and Korean firms in August 
1993. In this agreement, those Korean firms that were to manufacture 
commercial handsets and the wireless equipment part of the base systems 
agreed to pay royalties to Qualcomm for thirteen to fifteen years. However, 
Korean firms are under no obligation to pay royalties to Qualcomm on 
equipment, such as switching systems, developed based on domestic 
technology (SONG, 1999: 75). 
While ETRI, Qualcomm and Korean manufacturers were developing the 
technology and products, the Korean government had to make two major 
decisions: firstly, which companies would be the service providers or carriers 
and secondly, which standard would be applied to those carriers. 
Firstly, let us look at the selection of companies to be carriers. There was 
high demand for mobile telecommunications services around 1990 and this 
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called for the establishment of another carrier besides KMT. In July 1990, 
Daehan Telecom was appointed as the second service provider. However, 
as the main stockholder of the company was the Sunkyung (now SK) group 
and the owner of the group was a relative of the President of Korea, this 
decision became a political issue. As a result, the company relinquished its 
right to be a carrier to the government and a new decision process began. 
According to this new process, the decision was delegated to the Federation 
of Korean Industries, the coordinating organization of the private economic 
sector. In 1994, with the coordination of this organization, Sunkyung bought 
out KMT (renamed to SK Telecom in March 1997) instead of applying to be 
the second carrier and the second carrier ticket went to Shinsegi (became a 
part of SK Telecom in January 2002), in which POSCO and Kolon were 
majority shareholders (SONG, 1999: 89). 
The other decision to be taken by the government was regarding the 
technological standard to be adopted by the second carrier. Although the 
Ministry of Communication and ETRI were in favour of adopting CDMA as 
the technology standard, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI, changed to 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy in 1998) was opposed to the 
idea. In 1993, the Ministry of Trade and Industry emphasized the uncertainty 
in developing CDMA and gave its support to GSM for the new carrier. 
Eventually, however, the Ministry of Communication, which was given the 
right to make the final decision, announced in June 1993 that CDMA would 
be the national standard for the next generation. The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry subsequently changed its policy and decided only to develop 
handsets and their components based on GSM technology. According to this 
the plan, the Korean Electronics and Technology Institute (KETI), the MTI-
sponsored research institute and private firms such as Samsung Electronics, 
Kumsung Telecommunications, Daewoo Telecommunications and 
Dongyang Electronics and Communication, began the project of developing 
GSM-based handsets (SONG, 1999: 100). 
In the end, Shinsegi consequently became the second mobile 
telecommunications carrier in Korea and introduced a digital cellular service 
based on CDMA technology in April 1996. KMT, on the other hand, became 
a privatised firm in 1994 and started to test the same CDMA-based digital 
service in January 1996, while continuing to provide first generation 
analogue cellular services. 
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Development of CDMA for Personal Communication Service (PCS) 
Following its selection of a company as a second mobile carrier, the 
Korean government announced a reformation plan for the 
telecommunications industry in June 1994. The plan proposed that a new 
mobile telecommunication service called Personal Communication Service 
(PCS) should be introduced into the market. PCS was initially positioned as 
a service between wire-line and mobile telecommunications services and its 
objective was to provide a low-cost mobile service for pedestrians. 
The government policy for the development of PCS was quite different 
from that of the digital cellular telecommunication system. The essence of 
the policy was less governmental intervention and more leadership by 
private companies. In line with this policy, it was proposed that ETRI, 
receiving research funds from the government, develop only the basic 
technology and that service providers take responsibility for designing, 
developing and producing the whole system. The role of the government 
was even down-sized in terms of deciding which standard to adopt. This 
decision was delegated to the Telecommunication Technology Association 
(TTA) which coordinated the interests of the industry members. As for the 
specific work, ETRI was supposed to draw up a plan of the standard for PCS 
and to submit the plan to the TTA (SONG, 1999: 153). 
According to this policy, companies planning to enter the PCS market 
prepared a service and proposed the technological standard they wanted. 
Two groups competed for the industry standard. On one side, there was a 
group supporting CDMA technology. KMT began developing PCS in June 
1994 and proposed W-CDMA. Shinsegi, which began to develop PCS in 
1995, supported upband IS-95 CDMA. Dacom started preparing for PCS in 
1994 and supported GSM at first and W-CDMA. In addition, ETRI supported 
W-CDMA, and those manufacturers that participated in the CDMA 
development project supported both the CDMA and GSM standard. On the 
other side was a group supporting GSM technology. KT, the largest 
telecommunication company, began work on PCS in 1994 and supported 
GSM. KETI and those companies that had participated in KETI's project in 
the past, such as Daewoo Telecommunication and Hanhwa Information and 
Telecommunication, also supported GSM. 
The change in the PCS concept , however, was also accompanied by a 
change in situation. In July 1995, the Ministry of Information and 
Telecommunication announced that the concept of PCS was shifting from "a 
low-cost mobile service for pedestrians" to "a cellular mobile service with a 
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different frequency band". This meant that there would be no service 
difference between previous mobile telecommunications services and PCS. 
With this announcement, KMT and Shinsegi were deleted from the list of 
PCS candidates and KT was granted the privilege of becoming a PCS 
carrier. In addition, ETRI, which was in charge of proposing the plan for the 
PCS standard, formally proposed in October 1995 that the standard for PCS 
must be CDMA and that carriers had to choose between upband CDMA or 
W-CDMA. The next day, the Ministry of Information and Communications 
confirmed ETRI's proposal and CDMA became the formal standard for PCS. 
The government received applications for permission to offer PCS 
services in April 1996 and LG Telecom, Hansol PCS, and KT Freetel (now 
KTF) were finally selected as PCS carriers. These companies were soon 
able to launch the service, as upband CDMA was an extension of CDMA. 
The three new carriers introduced the commercial PCS service in October 
1997. However, Hansol PCS subsequently became a part of KTF in July 
2000. Shinsegi was also consolidated into SK Telecom in January 2002 as 
mentioned previously. As a result, there are now three carriers, SK Telecom, 
KTF, and LG Telecom, competing in the Korean mobile telecommunications 
market. 
National innovation system in second-generation technology 
It can be said that the success of the second-generation technology, 
CDMA, is the achievement of a fully-fledged national innovation system. This 
system can be summarized as in figure 5. As with first-generation 
technologies, the role of universities was negligible in the development of 
second-generation technologies. The distinguishing points in this generation 
are the leadership of the government-sponsored laboratories and the more 
important role played by domestic firms. The government still played a major 
role in setting the standard, but its intervention in the industry diminished. As 
for foreign companies, Qualcomm provided the fundamental basis for 
technological development, but firms such as Motorola and AT&T, which had 
been major players in the past, began to lose market share. We will now 
review the role of individual players focusing on how each contributed to the 
success of technological innovation. 
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Figure 5: National innovation system in the second-generation of the industry 
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The Korean Government 
The most important role played by the Korean government was to take 
the lead in setting technological standards in the industry. When the 
government considered another carrier for cellular mobile 
telecommunication, there were many technological options: analogue or 
digital, and even in the digital group, TDMA, GSM, or CDMA. In fact, there 
was competition to become the standard between the CDMA group, 
supported by the Ministry of Communication, and the GSM group, supported 
by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, but the government coordinated 
competition and was able to unify the standard into CDMA. The second 
cellular service provider, Shinsegi, was also suspicious of the unproven 
CDMA technology at first and tried to use an analogue system, but the 
government pushed the company to adopt the digital CDMA using its 
authority with regard to the permission to do business. 
The government also took the leader by choosing the technological 
standard for PCS, even though it delegated the selection to an industry 
association and intervened to a lesser extent in the selection process. PCS 
had previously been considered a low-cost and low-function service, but the 
government set the PCS concept to on an equal footing with that of the 
cellular mobile telecommunication service and made CDMA the standard, in 
spite of resistance from potential carriers, such as KT, which preferred GSM 
technology. 
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With this strong leadership in standard setting, the government was able 
to diminish the uncertainty of manufacturers involved in the supply of 
equipment and handsets. As CDMA was yet unproven technology in the 
market and even the potential carrier was reluctant to adopt it, there was a 
high level of uncertainty on the part of equipment and handset 
manufacturers. In this context, by promoting CDMA as the standard, the 
government assured those manufacturers of the existence of a market for 
CDMA. The setting of a single standard also made it possible for 
manufacturers to achieve economies of scale. As Korea was the first country 
to launch CDMA technology commercially, having a single standard helped 
manufacturers to obtain the necessary market size required to be 
successful. 
Another important role played by the government in this generation was 
its selection of companies as mobile telecommunications service providers. 
KMT was the only service provider in the first-generation and it was owned 
by the government. In the second-generation, however, a competitive 
market structure was devised. KMT was privatised and later became SK 
Telecom, and four new carriers, one in the cellular mobile and three in PCS, 
entered the market. Competition among carriers is also considered to be one 
of the reasons behind the success of the industry, as this competition 
continuously pushes carriers to upgrade their service quality. 
Government-sponsored laboratories 
ETRI was a key player in the development of CDMA technology. The 
organisation already had the successful development of TDX under its belt, 
as well as a pool of human resources specializing in the field of information 
and communication technology. Utilizing its experiences and resources, 
ETRI made major contributions to the success of the development of CDMA. 
First of all, ETRI profoundly engaged in the government's policy decision 
and initiated the CDMA standard in terms of digital cellular technology. In the 
case of PCS, although its role was to coordinate industry interests, the ETRI 
supported CDMA and eventually heavily influenced the government's choice 
of CDMA as a standard. Secondly, ETRI took responsibility for managing the 
whole project and received funds from the government. Finally, it actually 
participated in most of the development activities. The roles ETRI took in the 
development of CDMA are shown in figure 6. With the cooperation of 
Qualcomm, ETRI executed the basic design of the whole system and did 
detailed designs of base and control stations. As far as mobile exchangers 
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and location registers were concerned, ETRI did detailed designs without the 
help of Qualcomm. It also worked on detailed designs of handsets with 
manufacturers. Prototypes of each product were also made by ETRI. In the 
development of PCS, however, the role of ETRI diminished to the provision 
of the basic technology and most of the development work was done by the 
private sector. 
Figure 6: Division of roles in the development of CDMA 
for cellular mobile telecommunications 
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Original Source: HAN (1997). Recited from SONG (1999: 124) 
Domestic and foreign companies 
As mentioned above, mobile communications service providers were 
basically private companies in the second-generation. In the case of cellular 
mobile telecommunication, KMT (later SK Telecom) started commercial 
testing of the CDMA system in January 1996 and Shinsegi provided the first 
commercialized service in April 1996. Soon after this, PCS service providers 
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were selected and KT Freetel, Hansol PCS, and LG Telecom started the 
service in October 1997. Incidentally, the role of carriers differed with regard 
to the digital cellular and PCS systems. While ETRI was in charge of 
developing CDMA in the case of the cellular system, the carriers assumed 
leadership in developing their own systems and equipment for PCS. PCS 
carriers formed their own consortium for technology development and 
improved the quality of technology by interacting with equipment suppliers. 
With both cellular and PCS technologies, handset and equipment 
manufacturers were in charge of the commercial production of those 
products. Table 3 shows the roles of manufacturers in the development of 
cellular CDMA, which worked closely with ETRI. In the case of PCS, 
however, manufacturers directly worked with carriers within the consortium 
of each carrier, as shown in table 4. The activities of Samsung Electronics 
are particularly remarkable. The company was not only involved in the 
production of most products, but was also a major player in multiple 
consortiums. Compared to the prominent roles played by domestic firms, the 
roles of foreign companies diminished drastically. Given that domestic firms 
supplied most of the handsets and equipment, the foreign companies that 
dominated the first-generation market could not defend their market share. 
As provider of the basic CDMA technology, Qualcomm, on the other hand, 
rose up to be an important player and the recipient of lucrative royalties from 
equipment and handset manufacturers. 
Table 3: Roles of manufacturers in the development of CDMA for cellular 
Sub-Systems Participants 
Handsets Samsung Electronics, Kumsung Information and 
Communication, 
Hyundai Electronics, Maxon Electronics 
Base Stations Kumsung Information and Communication, Hyundai 
Electronics 
Control Stations Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics 
Exchange Stations Samsung Electronics, Kumsung Information and 
Communication 
Registers of Subscribers' Location Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics 
Original Source: HAN (1997). Recited from SONG (1999: 124) 
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Table 4: Suppliers of equipments for PCS carriers 
PCS Carriers Equipment Suppliers 
KT Freetel Samsung Electronics, Daewoo Telecommunication-Motorola 
Hansol PCS Samsung Electronics, Hanhwa Information and 
Telecommunication-Lucent 
LG Telecom LG Information and Telecommunication 
Source: CHUNG (1996: 90) 
! Discussion and Implications 
In the above sections, we have considered the national innovation 
systems in each generation of Korean mobile telecommunication 
technologies. The evolution pattern of the innovation system can be 
summarized as shown in figure 7. In this diagram, the second-generation is 
divided into two stages: the digital cellular system and PCS, as the initiation 
time of each system differed and the roles of each institution differed 
between the two stages. Here, we briefly review how the role of each player 
in the system changed. 
Figure 7: Evolution of the national innovation system in the Korean mobile 
telecommunications industry 
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Firstly, universities played an insignificant role in all generations. There 
are several possible reasons for the low involvement of universities in the 
innovation process. Firstly, this may be due to the characteristics of the type 
of R&D carried out and the industry. As the focus of R&D at that time was 
commercialization and huge R&D investment was required in the case of the 
telecommunications industry, universities may not have proved suitable 
players from the very beginning. From another perspective, the low R&D 
competence of Korean universities may also have been a key factor in their 
lack of involvement in R&D. LEE & SONG (1998) illustrated the low profile of 
the role played by Korean universities in the R&D field by arguing that 35.3% 
of research manpower worked in universities, but only 9.4% of R&D 
expenditure was devoted to universities. Most Korean universities are 
currently education-oriented, particularly towards undergraduate students, 
but the Korean government is now eager to turn Korean universities into 
world-class research universities. 
Secondly, it can be said that the role of government has diminished over 
time. In the first-generation, the carrier itself was a government-owned 
company and there was little room for the private sector. Government still 
played an important role in the development of the digital cellular mobile 
system. It not only determined the industry's technological standard, but was 
also heavily involved in the development process through its affiliated 
research institute, ETRI. In the case of PCS, however, the government 
intentionally reduced its involvement. It delegated the task of choosing the 
industry standard to an industry association and introduced a competitive 
market structure in the mobile telecommunication service industry, meaning 
it had less control over the industry. 
Thirdly, the role of government-sponsored laboratories, ETRI and KETI in 
our case, was mainly prominent in the development stage of the digital 
cellular system. ETRI not only coordinated the whole development project, 
but also provided the basic technology for each product. However, its role 
soon decreased as private companies began to accumulate technological 
competences, as was the case with PCS development. 
Finally, the trade-off between the roles played by domestic firms and 
foreign companies is clearly illustrated in figure 7. While foreign firms have 
gradually relinquished their role in the innovation system, domestic firms 
have played an increasingly important part. As a result, domestic firms play 
a major role in the development of PCS, while all other institutions have little 
influence over the process. This trade-off is considered to be related to the 
characteristics of both foreign and domestic firms. 
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At first, foreign handset and equipment manufacturers, particularly 
Motorola, were late in materializing the huge potential of new CDMA 
technology. They could have tried to keep their vested interests in the 
Korean analogue mobile telecommunications markets. They also invested in 
several technological options, while Korean manufacturers focused mainly 
on one technological option, CDMA, which was determined as the standard 
in the Korean market by the government. The Korean intellectual property 
system can be considered to have favored domestic firms, but this argument 
does not seem to offer much support for the decline of foreign firms in the 
Korean market. ETRI members realized the importance of intellectual 
properties later on and Korean firms, in the end, had to pay high royalties to 
Qualcomm, a venture business with only intellectual properties at the outset. 
The rapid accumulation of competence by domestic service providers 
and hardware manufacturers may be a more important reason for the trade-
off which may be linked with an organizational characteristic of Korean firms. 
Most carriers and handset and equipment manufacturers were member 
companies of Chaebol, a Korean Conglomerate, and this may have 
contributed to the rapid success of the industry. As member firms of 
Chaebol, they were in a position to overcome the high entry barriers such as 
massive capital investment in the carrier business and the significant 
technological risk in developing handsets and equipment and they 
possessed considerable bargaining power with government regulators. The 
reputation of Chaebol members as established organizations in Korean 
society, with companies such as SK and LG in the carrier business, 
Samsung, LG and Hyundai in the handset market, may have encouraged 
Korean people to adopt the new telecommunication services and products 
on offer. 
In conclusion, let us examine some of the implications of our analysis. 
The purpose of this paper was to discuss an evolution pattern of the national 
innovation system in a technology-following country with reference to the 
case of the Korean mobile telecommunications industry. We also expected 
to outline the policy implications of these developments to policy makers in a 
technology-following country. The observations above would seem to 
highlight the following policy implications with regard to the evolution pattern. 
These implications, based on the case of Korea, can be applied to NIES 
countries and many Asian and East-European nations that are eager to 
catch up and overtake advanced countries in technological competence. 
Firstly, governments in technology-following countries may need to take 
initiatives in the emerging stages of an industry such as the mobile 
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telecommunications industry, where high-risk and large-scale investment is 
required. In the long term, however, government may need to reduce its 
intervention and promote competition in the private sector. The reason for 
this is that government leadership can reduce uncertainty in the initial stage, 
but competition among private firms is a surer path to technological 
innovation in the later stages. 
In our case, Korean private firms were able to accumulate competence 
very rapidly, and thus took the lead in a very short space of time. An 
organizational characteristic of Korean firms, or Chaebol members, was 
considered as an explanatory factor in this paper, but the strategies 
employed by the Korean firms such as the carrier SK Telecom and the 
handset and equipment manufacturer Samsung Electronics to accumulate 
competences so quickly and expand business to foreign markets merit 
further detailed investigation in future research. This research topic may be 
of interest not only to the policy-makers of industrial organisations, but also 
to business strategy managers. 
Secondly, the government in a technology-following country may need to 
pay more attention to the possibility of role division or strategic alliance 
between its own country and advanced countries in the field of technological 
innovation. Previous research on international management or innovation, 
such as VERNON (1966), KIM (1980), and LEE et al. (1988), argues that the 
government or companies of developing countries tend to introduce mature 
technologies from advanced countries into the domestic market of their 
developing counterparts and later internalize and improve the technology. 
According to this argument, it would seem difficult for a developing country 
to establish its own new technology. Today, however, the globalization of the 
economy has made it more important than before for firms or governments 
in different countries to collaborate in terms of technological innovation and 
R&D. In view of this fact, architects of national innovation systems in 
technology-following countries should have a sense of international strategic 
alliances by, for example, doing applied development in their own countries 
and delegating basic development to advanced countries. 
 Our case of the Korean mobile telecommunications industry clearly 
supports the above assertion. The arguments of previous research seem to 
apply to the first-generation of the industry, the so-called analogue 
generation. However, the evolution pattern of CDMA technology no longer 
falls into line with this research. CDMA was not a mature technology, it was 
new and unproven. In this case, a company from an advanced country, 
Qualcomm, took responsibility for basic technological development, while 
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the public and private sectors of a technology-following country, Korea, did 
applied development and eventually succeeded in commercialising the 
technology. This type of strategic alliance between advanced and 
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